Republic of China–United States relations

Republic of China – United States relations

Taiwan

United States

Republic of China – United States relations are defined by the Taiwan Relations Act and are affected by the political status of Taiwan.

After the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, the United States recognized the Republic of China (ROC) government as the sole and legitimate government of China despite a number of governments ruling various parts of China. China was reunified by a single government, ROC, led by the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1928. The KMT lost effective control of mainland China in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Following the death of Mao Zedong and the start of reform and opening, the United States switched diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1979. The ROC however remains a strategic ally for the United States; thus the U.S. still maintain unofficial diplomatic relations through the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, which functions like an embassy; the current head of TECRO in Washington, D.C. is Jason Yuan. The American Institute in Taiwan functions as the embassy in Taipei, and its current director is Bill Stanton.

Contents

History

In October 1945, the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek were sent to Taiwan to accept the surrender of Japanese troops. However, during the period of the 1940s, there was no recognition by the United States Government that Taiwan had ever been incorporated into Chinese national territory.[1]

However, Chiang was suspicious of the American motives.[2] The American OSS (forerunner of the CIA) showed an interest in a plot to seize control of Chiang's regime. Chiang ordered the rebels involved executed.[3] Chiang felt no friendliness towards the United States, and viewed it as pursuing imperialist motives in China. Chiang did not want to be subordinate to either the United States or the Soviet Union, but jockeyed for room between the two and wanted to get the most out of the Soviet Union and the Americans without taking sides.[4] In fact, he predicted that war would come between the two, and they would both seek China's alliance, which he would use to China's advantage. Abusive incidents had occurred with a drunk American General making comments about Chiang's regime, and the rape of two Chinese school girls by American marines.[4]

Chiang also differed from the Americans in ideology issues. He organized the Kuomintang as a militaristic style party, oppressed dissension, and banned democracy.[5] Chiang completely ruled out democracy as possible for China.[6] In the Spring of 1945, Chiang initialized a commission for inaugurating a constitutional government. In it, he would return "supreme power" to the people through an elected assembly while admitting other parties into the government. [7] However, Chiang was to be control of the democratization process. Chiang felt that taking the risk of not crushing the Chinese communists before the democratization process justified the need to have good relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. [8]

Chiang double dealtwith the Soviets and Americans during the war, at first telling the Americans that they would be welcome in talks between the Soviet Union and China, then secretly telling the Soviets that the Americans were unimportant and their opinions were to be left out. At the same time, Chiang also positioned the American support and military power in China against the Soviet Union as a factor in the talks, stopping the Soviets from taking full advantage with the threat of American military action against the Soviets.[9]

Chiang's right hand man, the secret police Chief, Dai Li, was both Anti American, and anti communist.[10] Dai ordered Kuomintang agents to spy on American officers.[11] Earlier, he had been involved with the Blue Shirts Society, a fascist inspired paramilitary group in the Kuomintang, which wanted to expel Western and Japanese imperialists, crush the Communists, and eliminate feudalism.[12] Dai Li died in a plane crash, which was an assassination orchestrated by the American OSS or the communists.[13]

In 1949 during the Chinese Civil War, KMT lost control of mainland China and relocated the ROC capital to Taipei, and Communist Party of China established People's Republic of China on mainland China. Both the ROC and PRC governments claiming themselves as the sole and legitimate government of China.

The Republic of China government did not trust the United States. An enemy of the Chiang family, Wu Kuo-chen, was kicked out of his position of governor of Taiwan by Chiang Ching-kuo and fled to America in 1953. Chiang Kai-shek, president of the Republic of China, suspected that the American CIA was engineering a coup with Sun Li-jen, an American educated Chinese who attended the Virginia Military Institute, against Chiang's rule in Taiwan, and then make Taiwan an independent state. He responded by placing Sun under house arrest in 1955.[14][15]

Chiang Ching-kuo, educated in the Soviet Union, initiated Soviet style military organization in the Republic of China Military, reorganizing and Sovietizing the political officer corps, surveillance, and Kuomintang party activities were propagated throughout the military. Opposed to this was Sun Lijen, who was educated at the American Virginia Military Institute.[16]

A 1959 court case in Washington D.C. quoted the U.S. State Department's official position as being: " .... that the provisional capital of the Republic of China has been at Taipei, Taiwan (Formosa) since December 1949; that the Government of the Republic of China exercises authority over the island; that the sovereignty of Formosa has not been transferred to China; and that Formosa is not a part of China as a country, at least not as yet, and not until and unless appropriate treaties are hereafter entered into. Formosa may be said to be a territory or an area occupied and administered by the Government of the Republic of China, but is not officially recognized as being a part of the Republic of China."[17]

On January 1, 1979, the United States changed its diplomatic recognition of Chinese government from the ROC to the PRC. In the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué that announced the change, the United States recognized the Government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged the PRC position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The Joint Communiqué also stated that within this context the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people on Taiwan. Since then, the ROC has been referred by the United States government as 'Taiwan'.

On April 10, 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carter signed into law the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which created domestic legal authority for the conduct of unofficial relations with Taiwan. U.S. commercial, cultural, and other interaction with the people on Taiwan is facilitated through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private nonprofit corporation. The Institute has its headquarters in the Washington, DC area and has offices in Taipei and Kaohsiung. It is authorized to issue visas, accept passport applications, and provide assistance to U.S. citizens in Taiwan. A counterpart organization, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO), has been established by the ROC. It has its headquarters in Taipei, the representative branch office in Washington, DC, and 11 other Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices (TECO) in the continental U.S. and Guam. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) continues to provide the legal basis for the unofficial relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan, and enshrines the U.S. commitment to assisting Taiwan maintain its defensive capability.

Following de-recognition, the United States terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan as of January 1, 1980. However, the United States has continued the sale of appropriate defensive military equipment to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, which provides for such sales and which declares that peace and stability in the area are in U.S. interests. Sales of defensive military equipment are also consistent with the 1982 U.S.-P.R.C. Joint Communiqué.

The United States position on Taiwan is reflected in the Three Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The U.S. insists on the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences and encourages dialogue to help advance such an outcome. The U.S. does not support Taiwan independence. U.S. President George W. Bush stated on December 9, 2003 that the United States is opposed to any attempt by either side to unilaterally alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. While the United States welcomes recent exchanges that enhance channels of communication between leaders in Beijing and Taipei, the United States urges Beijing and Taipei to further advance cross-Strait relations, including direct discussions between the authorities in Beijing and elected leaders in Taipei.

U.S. commercial ties with Taiwan have been maintained and have expanded since 1979. Taiwan continues to enjoy Export-Import Bank financing, Overseas Private Investment Corporation guarantees, normal trade relations (NTR) status, and ready access to U.S. markets. In recent years, AIT commercial dealings with Taiwan have focused on expanding market access for American goods and services. AIT has been engaged in a series of trade discussions, which have focused on protection of intellectual property rights and market access for U.S. goods and services.

Maintaining diplomatic relations with the PRC has been recognized to be in the long-term interest of the United States by seven consecutive administrations; however, maintaining strong, unofficial relations with Taiwan is also a major U.S. goal, in line with its desire to further peace and stability in Asia. In keeping with its China policy, the U.S. does not support de jure Taiwan independence, but it does support Taiwan's membership in appropriate international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the Asian Development Bank, where statehood is not a requirement for membership. In addition, the U.S. supports appropriate opportunities for Taiwan's voice to be heard in organizations where its membership is not possible.

On 24 August 2010, the United States State Department announced a change to commercial sales of military equipment in place of the previous high provide Foreign Military Sales in the hope of avoiding political implications.[18] However pressure from the PRC has continued and it seems unlikely that Taiwan will be provided with advanced submarines or jet fighters.[19]

Taiwan has indicated that it is willing to host national missile defense radars to be tied into the American system, but is unwilling to pay for any further cost overruns in the systems.[20]

See also

External links

References

 This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Department of State (Background Notes).

  1. ^ "Plebiscite Proposal". http://www.taiwanbasic.com/nstatus/plebis.htm. Retrieved 2009-12-12. 
  2. ^ Jonathan Fenby (2005). Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf Publishers. p. 413. ISBN 0786714840. http://books.google.com/books?id=YkREps9oGR4C&dq=generalissimo+and+he+lost&q=chiang+american+motives#v=snippet&q=chiang%20did%20not%20like%20ally%20american%20motives&f=false. Retrieved 2010-06-28. 
  3. ^ Jonathan Fenby (2005). Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf Publishers. p. 412. ISBN 0786714840. http://books.google.com/books?id=GTgEPrlfvG4C&dq=chiang+portraits+streets&q=chiang+alientae+stalin#v=onepage&q=dai%20li%20oss&f=false. Retrieved 2010-06-28. 
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  11. ^ Jonathan Fenby (2005). Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf Publishers. p. 413. ISBN 0786714840. http://books.google.com/books?id=GTgEPrlfvG4C&dq=chiang+portraits+streets&q=chiang+alientae+stalin#v=onepage&q=dai%20li%20oss%20american%20officers%20spied&f=false. Retrieved 2010-06-28. 
  12. ^ Frederic E. Wakeman (2003). Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese secret service. University of California Press. p. 75. ISBN 0520234073. http://books.google.com/books?id=jYYYQYK6FAYC&pg=PA75&dq=blueshirts+red+bandits+foreign+insults&hl=en&ei=gWmaTKa2L8G88gaF0rSxAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false. Retrieved 2010-06-28. 
  13. ^ Jonathan Fenby (2005). Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf Publishers. p. 460. ISBN 0786714840. http://books.google.com/books?id=GTgEPrlfvG4C&dq=chiang+portraits+streets&q=chiang+alientae+stalin#v=snippet&q=dai%20li%20american%20sabotage%20plane&f=false. Retrieved 2010-06-28. 
  14. ^ Moody, Peter R. (1977). Opposition and dissent in contemporary China. Hoover Press. p. 302. ISBN 0817967710. http://books.google.com/books?id=AW9yrtekFRkC&pg=PA302&dq=sun+li+jen+americans+chiang&hl=en&ei=I679TJ2CMcKqlAfOu6WACQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CEAQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=sun%20li%20jen%20americans%20chiang&f=false. Retrieved 2010-11-30. 
  15. ^ Bernkopf Tucker, Nançy (1983). Patterns in the dust: Chinese-American relations and the recognition controversy, 1949-1950. Columbia University Press. p. 181. ISBN 0231053622,. http://books.google.com/books?id=YoB35f6HD9gC&pg=PA181&dq=sun+li+jen+americans+chiang&hl=en&ei=I679TJ2CMcKqlAfOu6WACQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10&ved=0CFEQ6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=sun%20li%20jen%20americans%20chiang&f=false. Retrieved 2010-06-28. 
  16. ^ Jay Taylor (2000). The Generalissimo's son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the revolutions in China and Taiwan. Harvard University Press. p. 195. ISBN 0674002873. http://books.google.com/books?id=_5R2fnVZXiwC&pg=PA195&dq=sun+li+jen+americans+chiang&hl=en&ei=I679TJ2CMcKqlAfOu6WACQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=sun%20li%20jen%20americans%20chiang&f=false. Retrieved 2010-06-28. 
  17. ^ Sheng v. Rogers, District of Columbia Circuit Court, 1959-10-06, http://www.taiwanbasic.com/state/usg/shengvsro.htm, retrieved 2010-02-27 
  18. ^ ROC Central News Agency U.S. arms sales to return to normal track: Taiwan official
  19. ^ Waldron, Greg. "Outlook gloomy for Taiwan F-16 C/D deal." Flight International, 26 May 2011.
  20. ^ "Taiwan rejects further advanced radar system price hikes." CNA, 14 June 2011.